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In the “Peacebuilding Compared” research project violence is seen as cascading across space and time within and between war-torn societies. This article il-
lustrates the cascade lens as a framework for hypothesis generation. Both violent actions and violent imaginaries cascade. The recent history of Sri Lanka is 
used to illustrate three cascade dynamics: crime cascades to war, war cascades to more war and to crime, and crime and war both cascade to state violence 
such as torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial execution. Sri Lanka is also a case that cascaded new technologies of crime-war globally, such as 
suicide bombing vests. These are not the only important cascade dynamics, just neglected ones. The implications of our cascade analysis are not mainly about 
building positive peace – peace with justice, participation, truth and reconciliation – at the end of tragic cascades. They are more about securing negative 
peace preventively at the onset of cascades.
1. The Cascade Concept
This essay contributes in a modest way to an ambitious 
research program on how violence begets violence, and 
obverse mechanisms whereby nonviolence begets nonviol-
ence. Gerlach (2010) argues that extremely violent societies 
are not violent in some cultural or essential way. Rather 
societies transition in and out of extremely violent periods 
of their histories as a result of crises. Karstedt’s (2012) work 
on her Violent Societies Index shows empirically that 
extremely violent societies experience disparate kinds of 
violence that are highly intercorrelated. This essay is about 
one dynamic that might be responsible for that empirical 
result – violence cascades across space and time from one 
kind of violence to another.
As in the cascading of water, violence and nonviolence can 
cascade down from commanding heights of power (as in 
waterfalls), up from powerless peripheries, and can undulate 
to spread horizontally (flowing from one space to another). 
The cascade metaphor has a long history in geology (Kun et 
al. 2014) and physics; water is not the only matter that cas-
cades: a spark causes fire to cascade up a mountain, down a 
gully, and across a plain. In particle physics, a shower is a 
cascade of secondary particles produced by a high-energy 
particle interacting with dense matter. In medicine, infec-
tion happens through particles that activate other biological 
particles to spread through cascades known as contagion. 
The cascade concept has been used before in the social 
sciences, in Sunstein’s (1997) norm cascades and Sikkink’s 
(2011) cascades of criminal enforcement for crimes against 
humanity. In the social sciences, phenomena like violence 
cascade through the agency of human actors, and through 
physical flows – of suicide bombs, of bodies of refugees. 
These cascades of objects can provide hospitable contexts 
for cascades of violent action.
This essay seeks inductively to illuminate how violence cas-
cades, using Sri Lanka as a least-likely case study (Eckstein 
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1975). The cascades framework we are in the process of 
developing conceives cascades of violence as recursively 
related to cascades of militarization and cascades of auth-
oritarianism (Braithwaite and D’Costa, forthcoming). The 
particular contribution of this article is to complement our 
earlier (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2012; Braithwaite 2012) 
and forthcoming empirically grounded hypotheses on cas-
cade dynamics with just three additional propositions:
1. Crime cascades to war;
2. War cascades transnationally to more war and more 
crime;
3. Both crime and war cascade to state violence such as 
torture.
These three cascades occur in almost all twenty-five armed 
conflicts where the preliminary core fieldwork has been 
completed (and seven hundred variables preliminarily 
coded) in the Peacebuilding Compared project 
(http://peacebuilding.anu.edu.au). This is an utterly non-
random sample of armed conflicts in which follow-up is 
required for another decade (all are post-1990 conflicts). 
The Peacebuilding Compared team led by John Braithwaite 
that is conducting the broader and longer term research 
will not assess this pattern as credible unless it continues to 
hold up in the years ahead for these twenty-five cases and 
until fieldwork-based coding has been completed on a 
more geographically representative sample of at least fifty, 
hopefully sixty, armed conflicts. This statistical approach to 
inference in the Peacebuilding Compared project is relent-
lessly complemented by a more historical and ideographic 
attitude to inference contained within single cases.
As illustrated by Sri Lanka’s three recent armed conflicts 
(only two of which qualify for the coding framework of 
Peacebuilding Compared), a single society, a single war, 
includes many degrees of freedom that support qualified 
inference about explanatory dynamics. For example, there 
are many ethnic riots, many assassinations at different 
points in the history of a society, from which theoretically 
relevant consequences might or might not flow. Sri Lanka 
is selected as a single society case to assist in the diagnosis 
of cascade dynamics, first because it is an outlier as an 
extremely violent society, second because it is a “least likely 
case” (Eckstein 1975), a case we expect to be least likely to 
validate hypotheses about violence begetting violence 
(because violence has worked decisively in ending Sri 
Lanka’s wars). The hope is that better theory emerges from 
a project that runs for more than twenty years when theory 
is continuously, provisionally, developed from partial data 
along the way. Perhaps this is especially so when it is con-
fronted with least likely cases, rather than rushed in a 
flurry of publication at the completion of overly abstracted 
data collection.
In the earlier published work on the various cascade 
dynamics so far detected as recurrent in Peacebuilding 
Compared, we have considered many other cascade 
dynamics, such as the way refugees flowing across borders 
cascade imaginaries of violence and recruitment oppor-
tunities for entrepreneurs of violence among the desperate 
residents of refugee camps. Violence cascades, we hypoth-
esise, when cascades of refugee flows interact with cascades 
of militarization and authoritarianism.1
Sri Lanka was the most consistently violent Asian society 
across recent decades on Karstedt’s Violent Societies Index 
(2012), though no longer in her most recent data (2014), 
where Pakistan is the most violent society in Asia and 
indeed globally. When Sri Lanka was confronted with an 
existential threat, it responded with security sector crimes 
that included summary executions, disappearances, tor-
ture, intentional bombing of Tamil hospitals, and rape of 
Tamil refugees (International Crisis Group 2011, 2013; 
Human Rights Watch 2010; United Nations 2011). These 
are familiar claims for most readers. They go to hypothesis 
3 above (crime and war cascade to state violence). Follow-
ing a brief overview of the Tamil radicalisation and class 
radicalisation that are relevant to our arguments, we pro-
vide an analysis of early phases of Sri Lanka’s conflicts to 
illustrate hypothesis 1 (crime cascades to war). Then we 
1 Here Sri Lanka is not used as a case study of this 
wider explanatory framework, but only to consider 
the above three propositions.
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move to hypothesis 2 (war cascades transnationally to 
more war and more crime). Finally we return to hypothesis 
3 on cascades of state crime after considering the para-
doxical quality of cascades of crime-war in Sri Lanka.
2. Context: Tamil and Class Radicalisation
Sri Lanka’s nationbuilding process and the ethnic identity 
politics of difference (Wickramasinghe 2006; De Silva 
2005) are deeply intertwined through a discursive process 
initiated by the predominantly Sinhalese-Buddhist state 
elites who took control of the postcolonial state (D’Costa 
2013). Class politics, as we will see, was also intertwined 
with a push-back by radical Sinhalese youth against state 
elites that cascaded to terrible violence in 1971 and 1987. 
In our narrative, we will attempt to unpack intersections 
between the kind of oppression in the Marxist imagin-
aries of these Sinhalese youth and in the ethnic identity 
politics of Tamil resistance to their oppression by state 
elites.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed 
on May 5, 1976, under the leadership of Velupillai Prabha-
karan. LTTE was a political party with various military 
wings, notably the Tigers (armed infantry), Sea Tigers 
(navy), Air Tigers (airforce) and Black Tigers (expertise in 
terrorism, including suicide bombing and assassinations).2 
While there were serious ethnic riots alleged to be orches-
trated by state actors in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1979, and 1981, 
the anti-Tamil pogrom commonly known as “Black July” 
that started on July 23, 1983, was a turning point in Sri 
Lanka’s history. An estimated three thousand Tamils were 
killed and more than 150,000 became homeless in mob 
violence that continued for three days. Many viewed the 
riots as triggered by an LTTE attack in Jaffna, in the North-
ern Province, that killed thirteen soldiers. A large number 
of Tamils were displaced and many who were able to leave 
moved to other parts of the globe. The LTTE declared its 
first “Eelam war,” marking the beginning of Sri Lanka’s long 
civil war.
After the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 29, 1987, the 
Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) moved in to enforce 
peace. The last IPKF contingents withdrew in March 1990, 
after which the second phase of the “Eelam war” was 
declared. During this phase the LTTE displaced nearly 
75,000 Muslims from the North.3 After an unsuccessful 
peace agreement with President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s 
government in 1994, the LTTE declared the third “Eelam 
war,” causing mass displacement and a humanitarian crisis, 
especially in the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni region in 
the north. After a four-year ceasefire, the fourth “Eelam 
war” was declared following the collapse of the peace pro-
cess in July 2006.
The LTTE’s deliberate recruitment strategies, which in ear-
lier decades might have been supported by some of the 
population, gradually came to be dreaded. They increased 
the vulnerabilities of the Tamil population in the Northern 
and Eastern provinces. While LTEE originally started to 
recruit women, it also began to recruit children in late 
1980s after the India-Sri Lanka Accord. Fighting an insur-
gency of this composition soon became an enormous chal-
lenge for the IPKF.
The fighting cadre of the LTTE comprised 30 percent 
women. Between 1987 and 2002, it is estimated that four 
thousand women were killed in combat, including over 
one hundred suicide bombers from the Black Tigers. 
Women in the LTTE were responsible for the deaths of 
prominent figures including Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi, who was assassinated on May 21, 1991, during his 
election campaign.
2 The Air Tigers were commanded by LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran’s son Charles Anthony, while the Sea 
Tigers, an amphibious warfare unit, which mainly 
consisted of lightweight boats was headed by Col. 
Soosai, a.k.a. Thilayampalam Sivanesan. A suicide 
commando unit called the Black Tigers (Karunku 
Puligal), which launched one of its first attacks 
against the Sri Lankan army in 1987 causing forty 
deaths, and an internationally operating intelligence 
unit (TOSI) were both headed by Shanmugaligam 
Sivashanker, better known as Pottu Amman.
3 Although the Muslims from the Tamil-dominated 
North speak Tamil, they are not generally con-
sidered ethnic Tamils. Before 1990s, nearly 5 percent 
of Sri Lankan Muslims lived in the Northern Prov-
ince. However, after the emergence of the Sri Lankan 
Muslim Congress in 1981, LTTE leaders perceived 
Muslims as a threat to the mono-ethnic Tamil 
nation and forced them to leave their homes. 
Researchers estimate that close to 75,000 Muslims 
were forcibly displaced during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (“Briefing: Sri Lanka’s Muslim IDPs 25 
years on,” http://www.irinnews.org/report/
97297/briefing-sri-lanka-s-muslim-idps-25-years-
on, accessed 8 March, 2015).
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The majority of the child recruitment by the LTTE 
occurred in the Vanni region. The United Nations esti-
mates it to comprise 64 percent boys and 36 percent girls. 
Following LTTE’s collapse, there is no new evidence of 
children being recruited. Both Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty suggest that the breakaway Tamil Makkal Vidu-
thalai Pulighal (TMVP), formerly led by Sri Lankan politi-
cian and former militant Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan 
(also known as Karuna), has been reconstituted and is now 
under the control of former LTTE cadre Sivanesathurai 
Chandrakanthan (also known as Pillayan). At least sixty 
persons who were originally recruited as children and are 
now adults are still associated with the group.
Between September 2007 and May 19, 2009, the Sri Lankan 
Army carried out a renewed military offensive in the Vanni 
using large-scale shelling that caused a large number of 
civilian deaths. Despite the grave danger, the LTTE refused 
civilians permission to leave and used them as hostages. 
Throughout the final stages of the war, the LTTE also con-
tinued carrying out suicide attacks against civilians outside 
the Vanni. A panel of experts appointed by United Nations 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to advise him on account-
ability for killing during the final stages of the conflict 
found “credible allegations” indicating war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed by both the Sri Lan-
kan army and the LTTE (UN Report 2011). The Sri Lankan 
government has refused to comply with repeated United 
Nations resolutions calling for an international investi-
gation into allegations of serious abuses by both sides in 
the country’s quarter-century civil war, where in the final 
six months of the conflict up to forty thousand civilians 
were killed and another six thousand forcibly disappeared 
(UN Report 2011).
The state’s imposition of an economic embargo on the con-
flict zone between 1990 and early 2002 has been the single 
most important cause of severe economic and social 
decline of the Northern and Eastern provinces (Sarvanan-
than 2007).4 The embargo was in force when the LTTE 
gained control of Jaffna Peninsula and almost the entire 
Northern province. Because it was a high security zone 
(HSZ) and heavily militarized area, peoples’ livelihoods 
were destroyed. Restrictions on fishing and subsistence far-
ming, landmines in agricultural areas, collapse of infra-
structure, especially major roads all were results of the area 
being declared as an HSZ. This intensified ethnic griev-
ances and generated deep divisions between the northeast 
and the other parts of Sri Lanka. During this period the 
number of serious crimes also escalated in these areas.
Extreme poverty in the Northern and Eastern provinces 
contributed to huge regional economic disparities with 
other regions of Sri Lanka. These two provinces comprise 
28 percent of Sri Lanka’s total area and 14 percent of the 
total population. The LTTE controlled 44 percent of the 
area and 20 percent of the population.5 While no house-
hold survey data are available to include the refugee camps 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the Vanni was per-
haps the worst affected by the protracted conflict. The 
inequality and the economic vulnerability of the popu-
lation were exacerbated by the fact that two parallel econ-
omic authorities existed in the provinces – the government 
and the LTTE. Illegal taxation by the LTTE to finance its 
activities and the formation of some administrative units 
by the LTTE such as the Tamil Eelam Police and the Tamil 
Eelam Judicial Service squeezed resources from the already 
vulnerable and impoverished communities. The LTTE was 
also involved in transnational crime, took relief goods from 
local and international donors and then sold them to the 
black market, and forcibly took lands from minority com-
munities (D’Costa 2013).
3. Crime Cascades to War in Sri Lanka
Historians do not always take seriously the proposition that 
crime often cascades to war (MacMillan, 2013). In a sense 
they are right that this should not be the most central 
element of cascades of violence theory. Yet perhaps his-
4 The embargo was in force between 1990 to 1996 
on the Jaffna Peninsula and until January 2002 in 
the Vanni region. Also, there was no electricity in the 
Vanni region between 1990 and 2002.
5 This data is valid until July 2006, before the final 
round of full-scale hostilities between the rebels and 
the government security forces. For details see Sar-
vananthan (2007).
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torians should treat it more seriously than they do. Sparks 
that ignite conflagrations matter. At the height of the tinder-
dry Australian bushfire season, the structural conditions are 
of large fires waiting to happen, awaiting the spark that 
causes the inevitable. Yet there can be no doubt that there 
would be more fires without education campaigns to dis-
suade smokers from throwing cigarettes from car windows, 
campers from lighting fires, rapid response to lightning 
strikes and to electricity lines needing repair. Likewise, we 
could think of effective counterterrorism to protect Arch-
duke Ferdinand from assassination in 1914 as a noteworthy 
path to war prevention not taken (Clarke 2013).6 It is dan-
gerous to neglect spark prevention. It is a conceit that one 
could understand structural conditions so well that one 
could know that a war, especially a world war, is so inevi-
table that it is hardly worth bothering with the sparks.
Of course most crime does not cascade to war. Most of us 
commit crimes in our lifetimes, sometimes major ones, 
without ever causing a war! Likewise, smokers dispose of 
cigarettes carelessly countless times, without causing a fire 
that destroys a town. To date in the Peacebuilding Com-
pared data set, some kinds of crimes are repeatedly coded 
as sparking armed conflicts. Political assassinations, major 
terrorist acts, and murder and rape in the context of eth-
nic/religious riots seem particularly important crimes to 
minimize for societies that seek peace.
The crime-cascades-to-war argument is easier to make 
today because few would question that the terrorism of 
September 11, 2001, resulted in a “War on Terror” which 
included invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The leadership 
of Velupillai Prabhakaran of LTTE for an independent 
Tamil state in Sri Lanka was critical to the escalation of 
violence. At the start of that war, the LTTE was just one of 
five major armed groups and another thirty minor ones 
pushing for Tamil independence. During the 1980s Prabha-
karan assassinated leaders of competing groups who did 
not submit completely to him, liquidating all competing 
Tamil insurgency groups. He also murdered LTTE 
members who questioned his judgment. Understanding the 
biography of a man who turned his society upside down is 
no easy matter. Frances Harrison (2012, 234) sees him as an 
example of trauma being “transmitted from one generation 
to another, storing up trouble for the future.” One story told 
by his father that greatly affected him was of a Hindu Brah-
min (most Tamils are Hindu) in the 1958 riots tied to a bed 
by the Buddhist Sinhalese mob, doused with petrol and 
burnt alive (Clarance 2007, 41). Prabhakaran also 
repeatedly used narratives of other violent crimes com-
mitted against Tamils to call for an armed struggle against 
the state. In a 1984 interview with an Indian magazine, 
Prabhakaran dubbed the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983 the 
“July Holocaust” and claimed that this experience united all 
sections of Tamil masses. He stated: “Armed struggle is the 
only way out for the emancipation of our oppressed 
people” (Thottam 2009). Prabhakaran is not the only Tiger 
leader for whom such crimes figured in their biography of 
their turn to violence.
The assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India 
in 1991 was both a crime caused by war and a crime that 
escalated war. It was an event that decisively changed the 
dynamics of Indian engagement with Sri Lanka’s war. 
After this, the Indian state and intelligence service was no 
longer playing a balancing game between sometimes 
currying favor from Tamil politicians in the Indian state of 
Tamil Nadu by supporting the Tamil insurgency in Sri 
Lanka, sometimes supporting the Sri Lankan state to 
enhance regional stability. After the young female suicide 
attacker killed Rajiv Gandhi, India’s regional military and 
intelligence might was committed to the ultimate defeat of 
the Tigers and played a major role, mostly covert, in 
delivering that military result. It was a result that did not 
come, however, until domestic Sri Lankan military leaders 
became convinced that they could and should win mili-
tarily. Assassination attempts were also relevant to that 
change of heart.
6 Otto von Bismark had a politician’s rather than a 
historian’s or sociologist’s sensibility when he said 
“some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” would 
one day cause a great European war (Harold Evans, 
“On the Brink”, New York Times, 9 May 2014).
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Some of our military informants in Sri Lanka argued that 
their failed assassination attempts on Gotabhaya Raja-
paksa, Sri Lankan Secretary of Defence and brother of the 
President, and army commander General Sarath Fonseka 
were even bigger LTTE mistakes than assassinating Rajiv 
Gandhi. These were the two men who persuaded the army 
that they could defeat the LTTE. Prior to their leadership of 
the late 2000s, the Sri Lankan military was persuaded by 
the militarily unsophisticated analysis of the international 
diplomatic community and Sri Lanka’s own strategic elite 
that LTTE was the world’s most militarily powerful terror-
ist organization. In retrospect, its accomplishments seem 
less formidable than those of the mujahidin of Afghanistan 
in driving out the Soviet army and then NATO. One Sri 
Lankan commander jumped from recognition of the 
undoubtedly formidable military capability of the LTTE to 
the inference that defeating it would prove as impossible as 
it was for France to defeat Ho Chi Minh’s army in Vietnam. 
According to our interviews, this was the answer one of Sri 
Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s five most sen-
ior military commanders gave on one occasion when she 
asked each for their assessment of the feasibility of aban-
doning peace talks in favor of a fully military solution. It 
was an answer that reflected the thinking of the Norwegian 
leadership of the post-2002 peace process,7 of European 
Union diplomats generally, and of the US State Depart-
ment.8 Fonseka served as the commander of the Sri Lankan 
army from December 2005 until mid-July 2009 and led the 
military to victory against the LTTE. However, he fell out 
with the government and challenged President Rajapaksa 
unsuccessfully during the subsequent election. Two weeks 
after his defeat, he was arrested and convicted by a military 
court on four counts of corruption in defence deals, 
bypassing military procedures in purchasing equipment, 
and nepotism.
The military defeat of the Tigers in 2009 can be read as a 
refutation of the cascade hypothesis. While thousands were 
killed in the final year of the long conflict, the government 
victory has resulted in a cessation of war deaths and almost 
complete cessation of Tamil terror. In other words, instead 
of cascading to more violence, the extreme violence of 2009 
seemed to end further violence rather decisively (for more 
examples, see Toft 2010). There is strong evidence that as 
long as LTTE leader Prabhakaran was alive, he would have 
used peace talks to regroup, recruit, and eliminate Tamil 
leaders who supported peace. Thus, it may always have 
been the case that a military solution was feasible and the 
most likely path to ending the killing. We do not argue that 
violence always cascades to further violence. Rather in our 
forthcoming book we make good use of the Sri Lankan 
case to inductively build an account of the contexts and 
ways in which violence does and does not cascade. As with 
all social science propositions, often it proves downright 
wrong that violence cascades. Nevertheless, even at this 
point of maximum invalidity in South Asia, we diagnose 
the cascade framework as providing fertile insights and 
correctives to offer the discerning analyst. Let us then turn 
to how one should salvage explanatory relevance of cas-
cade hypotheses even in this least likely case (Eckstein 
1975) of violence ending violence. A least likely case is a 
tough test of an explanation because it explores a context 
where the explanation is least likely to be true.
The hypothesis that violence cascades causes us to critique 
the maximalist way the Sri Lankan army conducted the 
7 “[Lead Norwegian diplomat] Eric Solheim had a 
meeting with President Rajapaksa in late March 
2006 where he told the president that Prabhakaran 
was a military genius and that it would be suicidal to 
take him on” (Chandraprema 2012, 312).
8 In our interview with the Sri Lankan military 
commander General Sarath Fonseka, he said that 
during the 2000s Pentagon analysts would engage 
very sympathetically with his analysis that he could 
militarily defeat the LTTE quite quickly. While US 
military leaders found that credible, State Depart-
ment officials saw military defeat of the LTTE as 
unrealistic. Fonseka described the reaction of the 
British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka after the 
July 21, 2006, LTTE provocation of closing the sluice 
gates that cut off Eastern province farmers from irri-
gation for their crops. After the LTTE had been 
routed in the region around the gates by August 14, 
Fonseka said the High Commissioner warned him 
that he should not assume that military victory in 
this region could be replicated across the North. 
Fonseka’s critique of Western diplomats was that 
they were always talking up the impossibility of 
military defeat of LTTE. Among the people who 
believed the Western diplomats’ analysis was the 
LTTE itself and the Tamil diaspora who funded 
LTTE’s military folly and kept pushing for a maxi-
malist military solution. From the moment of that 
military defeat around the sluice gates, Western 
diplomats should have been warning Tamil leaders 
that they must persuade Prabhakaran that military 
defeat was certain if he did not genuinely embrace a 
political settlement. General Fonseka’s comment in 
our 2013 interview was: “It probably would not have 
worked. Prabhakaran probably would not have been 
convinced. But that would have been the right way 
to go for the international community and the 
political leadership of Sri Lanka to work together to 
end terrorism.”
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final slaughter of the war. The insistence of the Sri Lankan 
government that the United Nations quit the North of Sri 
Lanka eight months before the final onslaught and the lack 
of UN insistence on its responsibility to protect civilians 
permitted a more vast slaughter than would otherwise have 
occurred. Greater slaughter, in the cascades account, builds 
the potential for larger future cascades of violence. A 
minimally sufficient military victory will induce lesser cas-
cade dynamics. The ruthlessness and authoritarianism of 
the unaccountable power afflicted on the Tamil civilians of 
2009 became part of a vicious cycle of unaccountable and 
violent authoritarianism imposed by the victorious regime 
over all Sri Lankans. Ending the war was politically popu-
lar, especially among the Sinhala majority; it was sold as a 
necessary kind of unaccountable power of the military and 
the President. Once a long period of wartime unac-
countability is entrenched, those who hold power are reluc-
tant to surrender it, especially when they can sell a 
narrative about the risk of the enemy rising again. Torture 
and disappearances for the opposition, and impunity of the 
regime for war crimes, are not the best policies for averting 
long-term cycles of violence. As Goodhand and Korf put it:
The Rajapaksa government may have thrown off the shackles of 
the “peace trap”, and successfully, in its own terms, pursued a 
war for peace, but escaping the “war trap” may be more difficult, 
as the coalitions and alliances constructed to pursue the war 
may impede its ability to forge a new broad-based political 
settlement for lasting peace (Goodhand and Korf 2011, 2).
The Sri Lankan state became a family firm of President 
Rajapaksa until his defeat in 2015, a state sheared of many 
of the constitutional checks and balances of its indepen-
dence constitution. As one party leader put it in our 2013 
interview: “The country today is run by criminals. Big busi-
ness belongs to the criminals.”9 Sri Lanka under President 
Rajapaksa acquired a form of crony capitalism where the 
ruling Rajapaksa brothers got a slice of the action from 
much of both the legitimate economy and the criminal 
economy. Two of President Rajapaksa’s brothers were the 
two most influential members of his government’s inner 
circle. The military was that part of the family firm con-
trolled by Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Before 
the Rajapaksa government, Sri Lanka was significantly 
under the control of a shadow government of a handful of 
criminal business entrepreneurs who used their income 
from control of gambling, drugs, prostitution, smuggling, 
and human trafficking to buy individual journalists, televi-
sion stations, and newspapers in order to shape the political 
environment. From that base, these business criminals 
moved up to control blue-chip companies. After the 2009 
military victory, the shadow government of organized busi-
ness criminals who were once the puppeteers of political 
leaders became the puppets of the brothers. Sri Lanka waits 
in hope to see whether the defeat of President Rajapaksa in 
the 2015 election by a senior defector from his own regime, 
President Maithripala Sirisena, will temper crony capitalism.
Blame for the maximalist slaughter and war crimes also lies 
with Prabhakaran. His engagement with a succession of 
peace processes was always tactical, less genuine than any-
one on the other side of the table. Even at the end, LTTE 
orders to shoot civilians who tried to surrender contributed 
to the slaughter (one war crime causing another). So did 
Prabhakaran’s decision to have his commanders attempt to 
sneak through the enemy lines wearing suicide vests to use 
should they fail (Harrison 2012, 67). They all did fail. When 
they were shot in suicide vests, the army could use this to 
justify murdering surrendering civilians. They also used an 
incident in February 2009 when the Tigers sent a female 
suicide bomber to mingle with a group of escaping civil-
ians; this operation killed twenty soldiers receiving them 
plus eight civilians (Harrison 2012, 102). That is not to 
excuse the mass murder of civilians, thirty-two artillery or 
air attacks on hospitals recorded by Human Rights Watch 
or the Red Cross, or the indiscriminate bombing of the 
final UN food convoy of the war (Harrison 2012, 90–91, 
240). It does, however, help explain mass murder in terms 
of a cascade of violence involving suicide vests (invented by 
LTTE to be cascaded globally mainly by Islamic jihadists). 
From Iraq to Afghanistan to Yemen to Pakistan, innocent 
9 This was the leader of the Marxist Party, JVP, 
which led the uprisings discussed in the next two 
sections of this paper.
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civilians are now repeatedly killed somewhere in the world 
on suspicion of being a suicide bomber.
Somasundaram argues that the development of the Tamil 
militancy and the LTTE suicide bombers can best be under-
stood in terms of socio-cultural and political contexts 
(2010, 423). He observes that while Tamils in Sri Lanka had 
often been stereotyped as somewhat submissive, the suicide 
cadres had developed very quickly following the 1983 riots. 
Somasundaram argues that “social sanction for a group to 
behave violently can bring out aggressive acts they had 
learnt or seen” and this increased the participation of Tamil 
youth in suicide attacks (2010, 422). Prabhakaran also advo-
cated the cult of cyanide capsules to Tamil rebels who were 
instructed to commit suicide rather than be captured by the 
state. This was the worst way that violence cascaded globally 
from Sri Lanka. It was the cascade of violence that gave the 
Sri Lankan state the green light from the United States, 
India, and China to “do what it takes to fight terrorism.” The 
prominence of that terror cascade in the calculations of the 
great powers was heightened by the Sea Tigers’ innovation 
of a suicide boat that speeds toward a navy ship; this was 
replicated by jihadists against the USS Cole in 2000.
A cascades analysis does not say military solutions never 
work. Our least-likely case analysis suggests that military 
solutions, even when they work, cascade violence. Hence, it 
warns that maximalist military solutions risk more virulent 
cascades of violence than minimalist ones. Second, it coun-
sels mobilizing the spectre of military defeat to motivate 
peace negotiations when military defeat is in reality a 
credible possibility (as in Iraq-Kuwait 1990, Sri Lanka 
2009). This is a better option with the Saddam Husseins and 
Prabhakarans of this world than purely facilitative diplo-
macy that fails to be assertive with military reality checks. It 
is a philosophy of preventive diplomacy as something that 
must be asserted, fail and fail again in multiple creative 
modalities before taking the risk with cascades of violence. 
One of those last chance modalities involves laying out the 
full brutality of the worst possible military consequences of 
shunning a political settlement. This is not best done by 
making threats, but by third party diplomats laying out the 
military reality check. Western diplomats share some blame 
for the cascades of violence from Sri Lanka for their failure 
to open their minds to the military reality and then to use it 
to try to motivate a diplomatic solution.
4. Crime-War and Security Dilemmas of the JVP: From Class Struggle to 
Ethnic Separatism
This section continues the analysis of hypothesis 1 (crime cas-
cades to war). It does so, however, by considering two other 
wars that immediately preceded the take-off of the Tamil 
insurgency. The first of these JVP civil wars was in 1971. War 
recurred in 1987–1989 when a Sinhala nationalist and Marx-
ist political party, the Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples’ 
Liberation Front, hereinafter JVP),10 took up arms against the 
state. Many JVP activists had disappeared before the conflict 
and thousands by the end of it. Many were also tortured and 
female activists were raped by the security forces (as also hap-
pened with LTTE women). This state crime was important to 
the onset of the cascade of violence that occurred.
The various phases of conflicts demonstrate that economic 
interests have played a major role in Sri Lankan ethnic 
rivalry. The class theories model of ethnic conflict (Horo-
witz 1985, chap. 3) demonstrates that there may be diver-
sity of conflict motives among different classes of the 
society. The economic rivalries between traders vs traders, 
clients vs traders/merchants, landowners vs labourers, 
labourers vs labourers may all further accentuate dif-
ferences marked by ethnic lines. In the mid-1980s, JVP’s 
financial support base was small entrepreneurs based in 
Colombo who either experienced rivalry from Tamil busi-
nesses or had difficulty in obtaining credit from banks that 
they believed were under disproportionate Tamil influence 
(Ponnambalam 1981). JVP led an unsuccessful youth rebel-
lion in 1971, which was crushed with a loss of four to ten 
thousand lives, and another armed uprising in 1987–89 
that again was put down at a cost of perhaps forty thou-
sand or more lives (Gunaratna 2001, 105, 269).
10 Following the split within the Ceylon Commu-
nist Party in 1963 roused by the Sino-Soviet conflict, 
Sri Lanka’s largest leftist party, JVP, was founded in 
1965. JVP has been described as “hydra-headed” and 
“phoenix-like” for its ability to regenerate despite 
being violently annihilated by the state.
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Just as the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the attempts on 
Rajapatsa and Fonseka were crimes that escalated plans for 
war, we can see that kind of cascade in the origins of the JVP 
uprisings in Sri Lanka. In our interviews, JVP leaders 
stressed that they turned to armed struggle because their 
party was being tyrannized by state violence in the form of 
arbitrary arrests, torture, and disappearances. In the litera-
ture (Gunaratna 2001, 269) and in our interviews, it was 
often said that the most fatal mistake JVP made was to 
announce that if members of the military and the police did 
not defect to them, they would kill their families. Some JVP 
members, without actually being ordered to do so by the JVP 
leadership, then indeed proceeded to kill family members of 
the security forces. They had delusions about their own 
power because they had already persuaded two thousand 
soldiers to desert, many to join JVP (Gunaratna 2001: 328).11 
Erroneously, they calculated that by threatening military 
families in the conditions of extreme uncertainty they had 
created by December 1988, when around a hundred people 
were being assassinated every day (Gunaratna 2001: 267), 
larger sections of the military might defect to them. Instead, 
JVP triggered a cascade of slaughter of their own cadres. The 
security forces recruited hit squads of soldiers and police 
whose family members had been killed by JVP (Gunaratna 
2001, 333, 338–39). They had no compunction about execu-
ting the systematic killing of the entire leadership of the JVP. 
Once almost all Politbureau and Central Committee 
members had been killed, the insurrection collapsed. On the 
other side, it was likewise a case of crime enabling civil war: 
“The JVP concentrated on recruiting members from houses 
set on fire and families in which brothers or fathers were 
killed or a female harassed or raped” (Gunaratna 2001, 295).
With the JVP uprisings, a Marxist imaginary cascaded viol-
ence:
Where there was a lot of influence on both JVP and LTTE from 
Marxism was when it comes to armed struggle. People thought, 
especially oppressed people thought, the best way was armed 
Assassinations on both sides in the failed JVP uprising of 
1971 motivated both to settle scores in 1987. The security 
forces argued that the government had erred in not wiping 
JVP out in 1971. In 1987 this perception also encouraged 
the security forces to believe that unless we wipe them out 
first, this time they will wipe out not only us but our 
families. This perceived security dilemma magnified and 
cascaded common criminal threats into an imperative for 
war.12 Deputy Inspector General of Police Premadasa 
Uduganpiola, the most efficient, ruthless death squad 
leader, who had lost his wife, children, mother, and brother 
to JVP said: “I did not want a Pol Pot regime to come” 
(Gunaratna 2001, 340). Even more interesting is the con-
siderable data supporting the analysis that the JVP pre-
maturely resorted to armed struggle against the 
government by attempting to capture the armouries of 
seventy-four police stations on April 5, 1971, and then 
abduct the prime minister and senior ministers, because of 
their analysis that if they did not strike first, the state 
would wipe them out in the way that the Indonesian gov-
ernment had wiped out its communist party in 1965 
(Cooke 2011, 122, 135; our interviews). That security 
dilemma analysis of JVP in 1971 was exaggerated because 
the Sri Lankan security forces did not see JVP as the threat 
that the Indonesian security forces saw in their communist 
party of 1965; the latter was the largest in the world out-
side China and the USSR and already wielded great power 
inside Sukarno’s government. Cascades of imaginaries can 
be as important as cascades of action. Imaginaries of pre-
emptive violence are spread by networks, in this case 
Marxist networks that conceived a security dilemma, even 
if it was not fully grounded in reality. What the security 
dilemma realities are matters little if key actors imagine 
that when they fail to act decisively to kill the enemy, the 
enemy will do so to them.
11 Others among these deserters and the estimated 
twenty thousand deserters from the long war against 
the Tamil insurgency (Gunaratna 2001, 368) became 
members of armed criminal gangs who did armed 
robberies, kidnapping for ransom, and contract kill-
ing, among other activities (a war leads to crime 
dynamic internal to the victorious army).
12  So far in the Peacebuilding Compared coding, 
security dilemmas mediate the magnification of 
violence in only some of the cases.
struggle because of the Marxist influence. They thought that kill-
ing was a good way to liberation. . . JVP and LTTE had the same 
heroes. It was not Gandhi. It was [advocates of violence like] Bose, 
Mao, Che, Castro. (1971 JVP leader interview 091338 in 2013)
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Preventive diplomacy was needed in 1971 to persuade JVP 
that they were not in that security dilemma and that parlia-
mentary politics was a more plausible path to power (which 
became a reality in 2004 when JVP became the third force 
in the Sri Lankan parliament with forty-one seats and vari-
ous ministerial portfolios). It was true that state crime 
against JVP cadres was also a cause of the 1971 uprising. So 
what we have here is serious state crime that needed to cease 
combined with an imagined security dilemma imported 
from state violence in Indonesia that triggered a cascade of 
JVP violence, that in turn triggered a cascade of state viol-
ence. All this was allowed to cascade for want of preventive 
diplomacy to provide a reality check to the immature politi-
cal minds of the JVP cadres of 1971, whose average age was 
twenty (Gunaratna 2001, 119). More mature minds might 
have persuaded them that they were not in as dire a security 
dilemma as they believed (or propagandized).
Our hypothesis is that the two JVP uprisings helped create 
a culture of violence and a legacy of untreated trauma in 
Sri Lanka. Beyond these profound ways that JVP violence 
contributed to crime (hypothesis 2), and was caused by it 
(hypothesis 1), in both uprisings common crime to steal 
guns was the principal way JVP armed. In addition, there 
were hundreds of major robberies planned by JVP from 
September 1986 of money, gold and other valuables that 
allowed them to buy guns (Gunaratna 2001, 267). Gunar-
atna describes this crime wave as contributing to anomie, a 
state of disorder where citizens no longer knew who was in 
charge or what the rules of social order were:
The gradual build up of crime and the accompanying brutaliz-
ation of the society was followed by the emergence of a lawless, 
a policyless and a leaderless nation. Two governments had 
emerged [JVP was called the “night government”] and the 
people did not know whom to support and follow. (Gunaratna 
2001, 270)
5. Paradoxes of the Cascades Between LTTE and JVP Violence
This section pursues greater complexity and nuance with 
hypothesis 2: that war cascades to more war and more 
crime. JVP always tended to be a Sinhala nationalist group 
and still is. It chose to reignite its uprising in 1987 because it 
believed that Sinhala dignity was challenged by the presence 
of an Indian peacekeeping force on Sri Lankan soil. JVP 
argued that the Sri Lankan government was allowing their 
country to be held hostage to Tamil division and Indian 
imperial designs. There was paradox therefore that LTTE 
had provided weapons, landmines, explosives, and training 
to JVP to weaken a Sri Lankan military that would have to 
fight on two fronts (Gunaratna 2001, 133). The LTTE threat 
cascaded through the intentional agency of LTTE strategists 
of violence who helped make JVP a more credible threat.
In the late 1980s the Sri Lankan state was suffering military 
defeats at the hands of the LTTE. It seemed to lead a society 
that was disintegrating. For that reason, the state at first wel-
comed Indian peacekeepers. Initially, Sri Lankan leaders 
hoped the Indians could get LTTE under control while they 
concentrated on subjugating JVP in the South. The next 
paradox was that JVP nationalist propaganda pilloried the 
state for its weakness in surrendering Sinhala sovereignty to 
the Indians. Indian intervention redefined JVP politics in Sri 
Lanka (Uyangoda 2008). This resonated in the South and 
built support for JVP. It helped destabilize President Jayew-
ardene, who lost power in 1989. Consequently, his successor, 
President Premadasa, was minded to convince the unpopu-
lar Indian peacekeepers to leave. Then came the next para-
doxical cascade, of the government of Sri Lanka replenishing 
the firepower of its principal enemy, the LTTE, so it could 
inflict more losses on the Indians. This it did, killing twelve 
hundred Indian peacekeepers. The peacekeepers had 
initially been fairly popular among Tamils; many Tamils 
were protected from the LTTE by the peacekeepers, and pro-
tected as a result of the pause from the more general ravages 
of war. LTTE maneuvered to undermine this Tamil civilian 
goodwill by firing on Indian troops from inside places of 
worship and other locales where Indian return fire would 
kill many Tamil civilians. Incidents of rape of Tamil women 
and other misconduct by demoralized Indian peacekeepers, 
who in our interviews found it hard to understand why they 
were there being killed, also made the cascade worse.
When a country at war has four combatants – a state mili-
tary, the Indian military, JVP and LTTE – and where, as we 
have seen, some combatants chose not only to escalate viol-
ence against enemies but also against “friends” who might 
resist their enemies as a result, cascades of violence can 
become convoluted and virulent (see Karstedt 2012 for a 
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discussion of this phenomenon including in the waves of 
violence in Sri Lanka). Organized crime then sees oppor-
tunities to enrol political parties to their projects, even to 
seek to take them over as some interviewees alleged organ-
ized crime interests did with the JVP. More mundanely, a 
climate of extreme violence created opportunities for Sri 
Lankan organized crime to promote protection rackets, in 
turn nurturing a political culture of corruption. Suicide 
(self-violence) also trebled between the 1960s and 1990s in 
Sri Lanka (Gombrich 2006, 25). Sri Lankans became inured 
to a culture of disappearances.
While we do not document cascades of state crime and 
combatant crime in detail here, it must be noted that abduc-
tions, disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, rape, and 
sexual violence were rampant in Sri Lanka during its 
twenty-six years of protracted warfare. Human rights organ-
izations and the United Nations document narratives of tor-
ture and killings (see Amnesty International 2013; Human 
Rights Watch 2011; UN Report 2011). Various regimes were 
quite open about making the fact of torture a common 
knowledge. “Disfigured heads and bodies were displayed 
openly to serve as a warning to the public. Such atrocities 
became commonplace. The existence of at least eight such 
torture chambers was discovered by a Commission investi-
gating disappearances in four provinces” (Commission of 
Inquiry into Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Per-
son in the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces 
1997, 34). In our interviews, Tamil activists also reported 
that there had been an increase in disappearances following 
the failed 2005 peace process. Human rights activists and Sri 
Lankan Tamils living in Jaffna and Colombo were fre-
quently “white vanned”. White vans without number plates 
picked up people who were usually never seen again. Inci-
dents of enforced disappearances continue even at present, 
though at a much lower level. A recent in-depth report that 
includes interviews with forty witnesses of sexual violence 
and torture notes that the witnesses had only been released 
after their family paid a large bribe to the security forces, 
most often brokered by a member of the EPDP or by well 
connected persons in Sri Lanka (Sooka 2014, 43).13 Domi-
nation dynamics that cascade from cascades among the four 
major combatant forces down to individuals take many 
forms: cascades of exclusion, militarism, cronyism, cor-
ruption and money politics, cascades of state terror and cas-
cades of class politics, among other domination dynamics.
6. Conclusion: Multiplicity in Crime-War Dynamics
Archer and Gartner (1984) showed that homicide rates rise 
after nations participate in wars at home or abroad (suppor-
ting hypothesis 2). There are other war-crime dynamics 
beyond those considered here that feed this result. We have 
illustrated but a few. These include war in Sri Lanka cascad-
ing to rape, during the war and in refugee camps afterwards, 
followed by murder to eliminate witnesses; war cascading to 
militarization of a society in which army officers steal land 
and businesses from people; war cascading to crony capital-
ism in which a ruling family loots the nation, corrupts 
accountability institutions and causes political opponents to 
disappear. In our forthcoming book, we catalogue in more 
detail war to crime cascades across South Asia in and 
between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Afghanis-
tan (Braithwaite and D’Costa forthcoming).
Many of the data points that drive the Archer and Gartner 
(1984) result are countries that experience elevated homi-
cide rates after participation in wars that end with a peace 
forged by military victory – World War I, World War II, the 
Vietnam War. At one level, major cases like these and Sri 
Lanka where peace is achieved through military victory do 
refute the simple hypothesis that war cascades to more war 
(consider Toft 2010). A cascade approach helps us unpack 
simple causation models that read Sri Lanka as a case of 
nonviolence secured through violence. We might likewise 
unpack World War I, World War II and the Indo-China War 
as cases that each included a cascade to genocide (to a Tur-
kish genocide against Armenians with World War I, Nazi 
genocide against Jews, Roma, and other non-Ayrian peoples 
such as disabled and LGT people with World War II, and 
Khmer Rouge genocide against class enemies of the new 
13 The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) is 
a political party and a pro-government paramilitary 
organization in Sri Lanka.
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Maoist Cambodia that included supporters of the defeated 
pro-US Lon Nol government, non-Maoist intellectuals, pro-
fessionals, monks, and people of Vietnamese and Chinese 
ancestry with the Indo-China war). Each of these genocides 
cascaded refugees who triggered other conflicts in places 
like Palestine; refugees from the Khmer Rouge (who mostly 
fled to Vietnam) encouraged the cascade to a Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia. Within each of these wars where 
military victory caused a peace, a war between A and B 
drags in C, which in turn drags in D and E. The fact that the 
cascade dynamics internal to these wars are so profound is 
what leads us to call two of them World Wars and to call 
what started as the Vietnam War the Indo-China War. Sri 
Lanka is not a case like these mega wars where large 
numbers of national armies are dragged in. Yet we can see 
the state military victory in the first JVP uprising as creating 
conditions not only for peace, but for the second JVP upris-
ing and the Tamil war, just as we can see this with respect to 
World War I creating conditions for World War II.
So we have illustrated how we must unpack cascades inter-
nal to a country case, and internal to a single war, to under-
stand the ways in which the peace-through-war script in 
Sri Lanka is not quite right. Just as Sri Lanka is not a case 
that cascades to world war, it is also not a case like Iraq 
(2003), El Salvador (Richani 2007), and various African 
cases where more people are killed by homicides, state viol-
ence, and armed gang violence after the peace agreement 
was signed than were being killed during the war. Even so, 
Sri Lanka powerfully demonstates the cascade dynamics of 
homicide leading to war and war leading to homicide.
Our research program conceives these as rather general 
dynamics. For example, in deciding to invade Iraq, Presi-
dent Bush’s inner circle undertook a static analysis of the 
cost and desirability of regime change in Iraq (see 
Woodward 2002, 2004; Loban 2013) rather than any 
recursive analysis of possible cascades. Our policy infer-
ence, of course, is that such decisions will be better if 
they are open to recursive diagnosis of cascade risks. 
President Bush did not weigh the costs of a crime wave 
in Iraq that took more lives than the invasion (Iraq Body 
Count 2012). More academics have been killed in Iraq 
(448) through kidnapping, suicide bombs and other viol-
ence than coalition forces up to the time of President 
Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” declaration (Griffis 
2014). President Bush did not weigh waves of traumat-
ized young American soldiers returning home to inflict 
violence on their families and on themselves. Nor was 
there any factoring in of the threat to American con-
stitutional values that state crime at institutions like Abu 
Graib, Guantanamo Bay, extraordinary rendition to 
totalitarian regimes like that of Libya, would have on the 
fabric of American society or on the lives of young 
Americans like Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning 
who exposed these state crimes. He did not weigh the 
risk of cascades to civil war that could empower some-
thing like Islamic State, led by a former inmate of Abu 
Graib prison.
Obversely, our analysis causes us to reconsider the import-
ance to war prevention of sharpened security sector and 
crime prevention competence. Improved democratic polic-
ing that might have prevented the anti-Tamil riots of 1956, 
1958, 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983 that so shaped the 
imagination of young LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhaka-
ran,14 improved policing that might have prevented his 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, are counterfactuals we can-
14 In this context, we mean democratic policing 
that is not captured by a ruling party or a dominant 
ethnic group, but that acts decisively to protect the 
rights of citizens of all ethnicities and parties. Across 
South Asia – in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, 
as well as Sri Lanka – there is a deep pathology of 
police being politicized rather than playing an inde-
pendent role in a separation of powers that sees 
them douse sparks of communal violence, which-
ever group is injured first. Braithwaite and D’Costa 
(forthcoming) see this as a cascade of violence from 
a colonial policing of the Raj that was politicized to 
defend British interests. We see the importance of 
this policing pathology in Wilkinson’s (2004) 
research that shows a history of cascades of violence 
of this type across hundreds of such communal riots 
in India. Where the police do show resolve to pre-
vent violence from spreading, to smother the sparks, 
they have overwhelmingly succeeded in doing so 
throughout Indian history. Wilkinson found that the 
cases where there is a lot of killing are cases where 
the police fail to show resolve. Failure of resolve in 
turn occurs because their state government is politi-
cally reluctant to allow the police to control a group 
that delivers electoral support to the party in power. 
One reason low-intensity Maoist insurgencies afflict 
some rural areas of half India’s states is that state 
political leaders have tolerated them or encouraged 
them. State leaders’ tolerance is because the insur-
gents mostly killed party-political opponents of 
those state leaders in the regions Maoists control 
(Chadha 2005: 375-6; Routray 2012:319). Likewise 
in Nepal, the king tolerated Maoist killings for years 
because they were killing his republican enemies in 
the democratic parties (Braithwaite and D’Costa, 
forthcoming).
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not empirically test.15 Yet we can hesitate to dismiss them 
as sparks that if extinguished would inevitably be followed 
by other sparks that light identical conflagrations. Extin-
guishing sparks that ignite wars is not as important as tack-
ling root causes of those wars such as the domination of 
Tamils, discrimination and violence against Tamils by a 
Sinhala nationalist state. Yet it is important.
Peacebuilders can be attentive to redressing root causes of 
regional cascades of violence at the same time as they also 
work at dampening all types of cascade dynamics. States 
and the UN can be moderate in deploying military power 
to guarantee a responsibility to protect civilians. It is poss-
ible to demand a political process and political transition 
backed by military might that threatens regime change, 
without moving with maximal force to war as the instru-
ment of regime change. When diplomacy and military 
deployment becomes more like that, extremely violent leg-
acy societies like Sri Lanka, parts of the former Yugoslavia, 
and Palestine can become less common. That at least is one 
policy hypothesis that motivates the ongoing inductive 
work of Peacebuilding Compared.
15 Similar arguments about improved policing can 
be made about Archduke Ferdinand’s assasination in 
1914 that sparked the Great War.
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